

Message Text

SECRET

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ORIGIN SS-25

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S/P:RBARTHOLOMEW

EUR:DSWARTZ

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OES:HBENGELSDORF

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EA:WGLEESTEEN (SUBS)

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM, TECH, PK, G

SUBJECT: PAKISTANI NUCLEAR FACILITIES

REFS: STATE 38095, 40475

FOR AMBASSADOR.

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING CONFIDENTIAL
LETTER FROM SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER
GENSCHER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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QUOTE. DEAR HANS-DIETRICH:

I KNOW THAT YOU ARE AWARE OF OUR CONCERN OVER THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN'S PLANS TO ACQUIRE A PILOT REPROCESSING PLANT FROM FRANCE AND A HEAVY WATER PLANT FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. I HAVE PERSONALLY DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO BUT HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED A DEFINITIVE RESPONSE. IN THE MEANTIME, I WANTED TO ENSURE THAT YOU UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THIS MATTER, AND TO ASK THAT IN REACHING A DECISION ON THIS TRANSACTION, YOU TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NOT

ONLY THE IMMEDIATE RISKS WHICH WE PERCEIVE BUT SOME OF THE LONGER-TERM IMPLICATIONS WHICH IN MY VIEW MUST BE CONSIDERED.

IN REVIEWING THE TOTALITY OF PAKISTAN'S PLANNED NUCLEAR PROGRAM, WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO AVOID THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. NEITHER A CHEMICAL REPROCESSING NOR A HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION CAPABILITY ARE NEEDED TO MEET PAKISTAN'S CIVIL NUCLEAR NEEDS. BOTH FACILITIES WOULD, HOWEVER, PROVIDE IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN AN INDIGENOUS CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. WHETHER OR NOT PAKISTAN IN FACT CHOOSES TO PRODUCE EXPLOSIVES, I BELIEVE THE CAPABILITY TO DO SO WOULD IN ITSELF CONTRIBUTE TO A HIGHLY UNSTABLE SITUATION IN SOUTH ASIA, WITH SHARPLY INCREASED DANGER THAT OTHER NATIONS WILL FEEL IMPELLED TO TAKE COUNTERMEASURES. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE WOULD INEVITABLY BE A GREATER RISK OF CONFLICT, WHICH BECAUSE OF ITS NUCLEAR ASPECT COULD THREATEN THE SECURITY OF COUNTRIES BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE AREA.

I AM ALSO CONCERNED THAT OUR LONG-TERM MUTUAL OBJECTIVE OF DEVELOPING NUCLEAR POWER AS AN ALTERNATIVE WORLD ENERGY SOURCE MAY BE PREJUDICED IF WE FAIL TO CONTAIN THE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM. THIS HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IN PURSUING GREATER COOPERATION AMONG MAJOR NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS. THE RECENT LONDON GUIDELINES, IN WHICH THE FRG PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE, ARE AA
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IMPRESSIVE START TOWARD SUCH COOPERATION. HOWEVER, I CANNOT STRESS TOO STRONGLY THE GROWING APPREHENSION IN THIS COUNTRY ABOUT THE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, AND MY OWN VIEW THAT UNLESS SUPPLIER GOVERNMENTS DEAL ADEQUATELY AND CONVINCINGLY WITH THOSE DANGERS IN PURSUING PEACEFUL NUCLEAR TRANSFERS, OUR LONG-TERM ECONOMIC INTERESTS AS WELL AS OUR SECURITY MAY BE AFFECTED.

I AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT'S RECENT DECISION TO DEFER FURTHER ACTION ON THE PROPOSED HEAVY WATER SALE UNTIL WE HAVE RECEIVED THE REACTIONS OF FRANCE AND PAKISTAN TO OUR RECENT APPROACHES. AS YOU MAY BE AWARE, WE HAD HOPED TO SEEK DEFERRAL OF THE FRENCH/PAKISTANI SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AT THE RECENT IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING IN VIENNA, IN ORDER TO ALLOW US MORE

TIME TO CONVINCE PAKISTAN THAT IT IS IN ITS OWN INTEREST NOT TO ACQUIRE SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES AT THIS TIME. THIS DID NOT PROVE FEASIBLE.

FOR PAKISTAN, AN INDEPENDENT ABILITY TO PRODUCE HEAVY WATER WOULD BE A CRITICAL LINK IN AN INDIGENOUS FUEL CYCLE WHICH WOULD GIVE PAKISTAN THE ABILITY TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. THEREFORE, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONALLY REVIEWING THIS PROBLEM IRRESPECTIVE OF WHAT POSITIONS OTHER GOVERNMENTS MAY ADOPT. WARM REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER. UNQUOTE. SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS IN POUCH.

2. AMBASSADOR SHOULD UNDERLINE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH USG VIEWS SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TRANSACTIONS (EVEN UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS) TO SENSITIVE COUNTRIES SUCH AS PAKISTAN, WHICH HAS SECURITY INCENTIVE TO MATCH INDIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND WHICH LACKS CREDIBLE ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR ACQUIRING COMPLETE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE.

3. AMBASSADOR MAY NOTE THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER, IN MARCH 9 APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE STRESSED IMPORTANCE USG ATTACHES TO SUPPLIER CONSULTATIONS ON SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TRANSACTIONS AND NOTED STRONG U.S.

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PREFERENCE FOR RESTRAINT ON SUCH TRANSACTIONS, PARTICULARLY IN CASE OF COUNTRIES SUCH AS PAKISTAN, AND U.S. SUPPORT FOR EXPLORING REGIONAL MULTINATIONAL ALTERNATIVES AS NEEDED. IN CONTEXT OF EMPHASIZING NON-PROLIFERATION AS A CENTRAL U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVE, SECRETARY EXPRESSED COMMON CONCERN OF ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS ON NEED TO CONSTRAIN SPREAD OF NATIONAL REPROCESSING AND OTHER SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES, AND CONFIRMED U.S. POLICY OF AVOIDING EXPORT OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY.

4. FOR OTTAWA. DEPARTMENT INTENDS TO INFORM CANADIAN EMBASSY OF SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER AND TO INDICATE THAT ANY SUPPORTIVE ACTIONS CANADA MIGHT TAKE WOULD OF COURSE BE WELCOMED.

INGERSOLL

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